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Abstract
Background: Learning from adverse events and near misses may reduce the incidence of preventable errors.
Current literature on adverse events and near misses in the ICU focuses on errors reported by nurses and
intensivists. ICU near misses identified by anesthesia providers may reveal critical events, causal mechanisms and
system weaknesses not identified by other providers, and may differ in character and causality from near misses in
other anesthesia locations.
Methods: We analyzed events reported to our anesthesia near miss reporting system from 2009 to 2011. We
compared causative mechanisms of ICU near misses with near misses in other anesthesia locations.
Results: A total of 1,811 near misses were reported, of which 22 (1.2 %) originated in the ICU. Five causal
mechanisms explained over half of ICU near misses. Compared to near misses from other locations, near misses
from the ICU were more likely to occur while on call (45 % vs. 19 %, p = 0.001), and were more likely to be
associated with airway management (50 % vs. 12 %, p < 0.001). ICU near misses were less likely to be associated
with equipment issues (23 % vs. 48 %, p = 0.02).
Conclusions: A limited number of causal mechanisms explained the majority of ICU near misses, providing targets
for quality improvement. Errors associated with airway management in the ICU may be underappreciated. Specialist
consultants can identify systems weaknesses not identified by critical care providers, and should be engaged in the
ICU patient safety movement.
Keywords: Incident reporting, Adverse event, Near miss, Critical care, Critical care anesthesiology, Airway
management
Background
Preventable errors are estimated to cause nearly 100,000
deaths in the United States each year, and cost the
healthcare system $9 billion annually [1]. Errors occur
more frequently in the intensive care unit (ICU) than
other areas of the hospital due to the acuity of illness
and the frequency and complexity of interventions [2].
Incident reporting systems and protocols for the analysis
of patient safety events are essential components of ICU
patient safety programs, [3] since learning from adverse
events may reduce the incidence of preventable errors.
Current literature on adverse events and near misses
in the ICU primarily relies on events reported by critical
care nurses and intensivist physicians [4–9]. Anesthesia
providers also play an important role in caring for the
critically ill, not only as members of the ICU team, but
in the provision of anesthesia for procedures performed
in the ICU, transport and handoff of patients traveling
to or from procedures outside the ICU, and response to
emergencies requiring airway management or cardiopul-
monary resuscitation. To our knowledge, no study has
focused solely on patient safety events in the ICU from
the unique perspective of the anesthesiologist.
We hypothesized that analysis of patient safety events
in the ICU identified by anesthesia providers may reveal
critical events, causal mechanisms, and system weak-
nesses not identified in previous literature on the topic.
Furthermore, patient safety events in the ICU may differ
in character and causal mechanisms from events identi-
fied by anesthesia providers in other locations in the
hospital, underscoring the important and unique role of
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the anesthesiologist in care of the critically ill. Thus, we
sought to characterize near miss reports submitted by
anesthesia providers in the ICU to our department’s near
miss reporting system and compare them to reports
submitted by anesthesia providers in other hospital lo-
cations in order to highlight unidentified weaknesses in




The University of California, San Francisco (UCSF)
Medical Center is a 560-bed academic quaternary care
hospital with 77 adult ICU beds (32 medical/surgical,
29 neuroscience, and 16 cardiology/cardiothoracic sur-
gery) and 76 pediatric ICU beds (17 medical/surgical, 8
cardiology/cardiothoracic surgical, 51 neonatal). The
adult medical/surgical ICUs are closed for malignant
hematology patients and patients of surgical subspecial-
ists, such that the ICU team takes primary care of ap-
proximately one-third of ICU admissions. For all other
patients, the adult medical/surgical ICU is semi-
closed—primary care of the patient is the responsibility
of the admitting service, but intensivist consultation is
mandatory. In the adult neuroscience and cardiology/
cardiothoracic ICUs, there is mandatory intensivist con-
sultation only for patients requiring mechanical ventila-
tion; intensivist consultation for other patients occurs at
the discretion of the primary team. The typical adult
critical care team includes residents from the depart-
ments of medicine, anesthesia, and emergency medi-
cine; a critical care fellow from the department of
medicine, surgery, anesthesia, emergency medicine, or
neurology; and a board-certified or board-eligible
intensivist from the department of medicine, surgery,
or anesthesia. Intensivist coverage is provided by
anesthesia intensivists 60 % of the time. All of the
pediatric and neonatal ICUs are closed, with care pro-
vided by critical care trained pediatric intensivists in
conjunction with pediatric critical care fellows, neonat-
ology fellows, and pediatric residents.
The UCSF Department of Anesthesia and Perioperative
Care provides anesthesia services at six sites in San
Francisco: a 560-bed tertiary care academic medical
center (UCSF Medical Center), a 564-bed hospital and
trauma center owned and operated by the city and
county of San Francisco, a 90-bed academic hospital
and comprehensive cancer center, a 104-bed Veteran’s
Affairs Hospital, a six-operating room outpatient surgery
center associated with UCSF Medical Center, and a
four-operating room stand alone orthopedic surgery
center. The department is housed at the UCSF Medical
Center and the majority of clinical care occurs there, in
the operating rooms, preoperative and postoperative
areas, labor and delivery, remote locations, and the ICU.
The department includes 24 board-certified intensivists,
who attend in the adult medical/surgical ICUs as well as
the adult subspecialty ICUs at UCSF Medical Center.
Anesthesia residents and anesthesia critical care fellows
rotate through the adult ICUs during their training.
Anesthesia providers do not staff the pediatric ICUs. In
addition to the role of anesthesia providers on the adult
critical care team described above, anesthesia providers
may also be involved in adult or pediatric ICU patient
care during patient handoffs (transport to or from pro-
cedures), provision of anesthesia for procedures per-
formed in the ICU, airway emergencies, and code blues.
Data source
On January 1, 2009, the department instituted a near
miss reporting system in order to capture and study
potential incidents that occur during the provision of
anesthesia. Near miss reports are submitted by anesthesia
providers (faculty, certified registered nurse anesthetists,
residents, and fellows) via a voluntary, anonymous, self-
reporting, internet-based near miss reporting system
(Fig. 1). Near miss reports can be submitted by providers
at any of the six sites. For each report, the hospital site, lo-
cation within the hospital, and time of day (day versus
night or weekend) of the event are entered via radio but-
tons. Possible event locations include the operating room,
post-anesthesia care unit (PACU) or preoperative area,
labor and delivery, ICU, and remote locations. The pro-
vider also submits a free text description of the event, and
identifies putative causative mechanism(s) associated with
the event via a series of check boxes. The causative mech-
anisms are based on the Joint Commission patient safety
event taxonomy [10]. Since more than one causative
mechanism can be selected per event, the total number of
causative mechanisms exceeds the total number of events.
Given the anonymous nature of the reporting system,
and the fact that no patient identifiable information is
collected, no post-hoc validation of the causes of the
near misses was possible.
Study design and statistical analysis
Approval for this study was obtained from the UCSF
Institutional Review Board, and the requirement for
written informed consent was waived.
We retrospectively analyzed near miss reports submit-
ted from January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2011 from the
UCSF Medical Center. Near miss reports from other
UCSF anesthesia sites were excluded from this analysis
since these other sites also have their own internal near
miss reporting system such that reports submitted to the
departmental near miss system may not be representative
of all near misses, and/or the sites do not have intensive
care units. Descriptive statistics are stated as frequency
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and percentage. We characterized the near misses based
on the causal mechanisms associated with each report.
Using the Joint Commission patient safety event tax-
onomy, [10] we categorized near misses as technical or
non-technical near misses, near misses associated with
equipment, near misses associated with systems errors,
near misses associated with human errors, and near mis-
ses due to a poor culture of safety. Human and systems er-
rors were not mutually exclusive since multiple causative
mechanisms could be associated with a single near miss.
One author (AKML) identified near misses associated
with airway management based on the free text descrip-
tion. We compared causative mechanisms of reports from
the ICU with reports from other anesthesia locations.
Since the ICU is an alternate location for pre-and post-
operative care, we performed a pre-planned subgroup
analysis comparing causative mechanisms of ICU near
misses with PACU/preoperative near misses. Given the
association of ICU near misses and airway management,
we performed a post-hoc analysis comparing near mis-
ses associated with airway management in the ICU to
near misses associated with airway management occur-
ring outside the ICU. Associations were tested using the
Χ2 test, Fisher’s exact test, and logistic regression.
Statistical analysis was performed using Stata/IC 12.1
(StataCorp, College Station, TX).
Results
A total of 15,704 patients were admitted to the adult
ICU and 7,672 were admitted to the pediatric ICU dur-
ing the study period, for a total of 64,307 adult ICU pa-
tient days and 62,151 pediatric ICU patient days. There
Fig. 1 Near miss reporting system user interface. ML, Moffitt Long Hospital; Zion, Mount Zion Hospital; SFGH, San Francisco General Hospital; VA,
San Francisco Veteran’s Affairs Hospital; ASC, Ambulatory Surgery Center; OI, Orthopedic Institute; OR, operating room; OB, obstetrical ward; ICU,
intensive care unit; PACU/Preop, Post-operative and pre-operative care units; IV, intravenous line; PG and E, Pacific Gas and Electric; EP, electrophysiology;
MRI, magnetic resonance imaging; NPO, nil per os (nothing by mouth)
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were 63,818 anesthesia cases over the same time period,
of which 44,465 (69.7 %) took place in the main operat-
ing room, and 811 (1.27 %) occurred in the ICU. Near
miss reports totaled 1,811, of which 1,529 (84.4 %) origi-
nated in the main operating room and 22 (1.2 %) origi-
nated in the ICU. Of the ICU near misses, 18 (82 %)
were from the adult ICUs and 4 (18 %) were from the
pediatric ICUs. Near miss reports were generated from
2.8 % of non-ICU anesthesia cases, 2.7 % of ICU
anesthesia cases, and 0.09 % of ICU admissions. There
were 0.17 near misses reported per 1,000 ICU patient
days.
Five mechanisms were reported as underlying over
half of ICU near misses: failure to execute a task appro-
priately (16 %), poor communication (12 %), failure to
perform a routine task (12 %), poor culture of safety
(8 %), and equipment malfunction (8 %) (Table 1). Sixty-
four percent of near misses were associated with a sys-
tems error, and 41 % were associated with a human
error. Compared with near misses from other locations,
near misses from the ICU were more likely to occur
while on call (45 % vs. 19 %, p = 0.001), and were more
likely to be associated with airway management (50 %
vs. 12 %, p < 0.001). ICU near misses were less likely
than near misses from other locations to be associated
with equipment issues (23 % vs. 48 %, respectively,
p = 0.02). ICU and non-ICU near misses were equally
likely to be associated with human errors (41 % vs. 42 %,
respectively, p = 0.92), systems errors (64 % vs. 68 %,
p = 0.7), technical errors (32 % vs. 49 %, p = 0.10),
and a poor culture of safety (9 % vs. 11 %, p = 0.78)
(Table 2).
In a pre-planned subgroup analysis, ICU near mis-
ses were more likely to occur on call (55 % vs. 45 %,
p = 0.009) and more likely to be associated with airway
management (50 % vs. 13 %, 0.001) than near misses oc-
curring in the preoperative area or PACU. In a post-hoc
analysis, airway-related near misses from the ICU did not
differ from airway-related near misses occurring outside
the ICU in terms of association with human errors, sys-
tems errors, technical errors, equipment errors or a
poor culture of safety. Airway-related ICU near misses
were more likely to have occurred on call than airway-
related near misses occurring outside the ICU (64 % vs.
14 %, p < 0.001).
Sample free text descriptions of ICU near misses are
shown in Table 3. Examples highlight problems in airway
management and other anesthesia issues, such as pain
management and the care of in-dwelling catheters.
Discussion
This study focused on near misses reported by
anesthesia providers in the ICU over a three-year period.
Although near misses were reported infrequently, our
analysis of near miss reports revealed several salient
points. First, out of 33 possible causes, five mechanisms
explained over half of the near misses reported. Nearly
two-thirds of near misses were associated with at least
one systems error, and over 40 % of near misses were as-
sociated with at least one human error. Errors due to
human factors, such as failure of the provider to perform
a routine task or complete a task appropriately, deserve
special attention since they are associated with increased
length of stay, [11] and are difficult to address with
Table 1 Causal mechanisms associated with near miss reports
originating in the ICU, based on Joint Commission patient
safety event taxonomy
n %
Skill based: failure to execute a task appropriately 4 16 %
Poor communication 3 12 %
Rule based: failure to perform routine task 3 12 %
Poor culture of safety 2 8 %
Equipment malfunction 2 8 %
Inadequate resources 1 4 %
Time pressure 1 4 %
Faulty design 1 4 %
Faulty construction 1 4 %
Obsolescence 1 4 %
Equipment unavailability 1 4 %
Technical failures beyond control of
the institution
1 4 %
Insufficient supervision 1 4 %
Failures related to patient factors
beyond control of the institution
1 4 %
Intentional violation 1 4 %
Insufficient training 1 4 %
Total 25 100 %
Table 2 Comparison of ICU near misses to near misses from
other anesthesia locations
ICU, n (%) Other anesthesia
locations, n (%)
p-value
Time of Day 0.001
Day 12 (55) 1457 (81)
Call (night/weekend) 10 (45) 332 (19)
Type of Error
Human 9 (41) 752 (42) 0.92
Systems 14 (64) 1208 (68) 0.70
Airway-related Error 11 (50) 223 (12) <0.001
Technical Error 7 (32) 884 (49) 0.10
Equipment Error 5 (23) 855 (48) 0.02
Poor Culture of Safety 2 (9) 196 (11) 0.56
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conventional patient safety interventions, such as sys-
tems modifications and provider education [12]. Other
causal mechanisms that were common in this study,
such as a poor culture of safety and equipment malfunc-
tion, reveal gaps in systems integrity and identify modi-
fications that could improve patient safety, such as
organizational changes to promote blame-free reporting
and engineering “checks” to identify faulty material
goods.
Second, in our study, near misses in the ICU differed
from near misses that occurred in other anesthesia loca-
tions in several important ways. Near misses in the ICU
were more likely to occur at night or on the weekend, as
opposed to during the day. The increased incidence of
near misses on call may be due to decreased ICU staff-
ing and increased anesthesia involvement in critical care
emergencies during those times, and highlights the need
to examine the organization, structure and delivery of
critical care during off-hours. Additionally, ICU near
misses were more likely to be related to airway manage-
ment than near misses occurring outside of the ICU.
This is likely a reflection of the larger proportion of
airway-related tasks (such as airway management in the
setting of respiratory distress or cardiac arrest) per-
formed by the anesthesia provider in the ICU as com-
pared to other anesthesia locations. However, airway-
related events warrant attention since they are frequently
associated with physical injury, increased hospital length
of stay, and family dissatisfaction, and may be mitigated
by adequate ICU staffing and the use of skilled assistants
[4]. The use of a recently developed clinical prediction
score to identify difficult intubations a priori [13] may
further reduce airway-related complications.
Third, ICU near misses were less likely than near
misses in other anesthesia locations to be associated
with equipment errors. Despite this difference, equip-
ment errors remain an important priority given they
may be easily addressed by interventions at the
systems-level.
Finally, the rate of near misses reported in the ICU
and OR was similar. Although this may be due to a bias
in the type of reporting system used, it also suggests
anesthesiologist involvement in the ICU may result in
lower event rates.
Existing literature on adverse events and near misses
in the ICU is primarily based on incident reports sub-
mitted by critical care nurses and intensivists [4–9]. To
our knowledge, this is the first study evaluating patient
safety in the ICU from the unique perspective of the
anesthesiologist. The results of our study differ from the
results of previous studies, supporting our hypothesis
that anesthesia providers can highlight systems weak-
nesses and causal mechanisms in the ICU not identified
by other personnel. As compared to previous work on
critical incidents in the ICU by Donchin, et al., a larger
proportion of near misses from our study occurred at
night or on the weekend, [14] which could imply that
decreased staffing in the ICU on off-hours impacts the
ability of critical care providers to recognize, react to,
and report near misses and adverse events. Additionally,
the rate of technical errors in the ICU in our study was
lower than previous estimates, [9] which was somewhat
surprising given the technical role of the anesthesiologist
in airway management and resuscitation. Finally, com-
pared to an analysis of the Intensive Care Unit Safety
Reporting System, [4] the proportion of reports related
to airway management was much higher in our study.
Although this finding is due in part to the larger role in
airway management of the anesthesia provider as com-
pared to non-anesthesia critical care providers, it also
highlights the gaps in incident reporting that may occur
when incident reporting is limited to the ICU team, and
suggests that specialist consultants should be engaged in
the ICU patient safety movement.
Table 3 Sample free text description of near miss events in the ICU
Description of incident Causal mechanisms
Patient from ICU with [right] radial [arterial] line. [Arterial] line tubing taped tightly around the thumb
such that there was a groove in the skin. Patient intubated and unconscious so cannot tell if there is an
injury to the digital nerve to thumb [that] may have been compressed for two days.
Poor culture of safety Failure to execute a
task appropriately
Patient with difficult mask and intubation extubated evening before major surgery and two teams caring
for patient in ICU…did not communicate surgery schedule.
Poor culture of safety
One of our pain service patients had a 3-hour delay between asking for oxycodone for breakthrough
pain and when he actually got it…apparently the orders got missed in his transfer between the ICU and
the floor.
Time pressure
Hallway blocked on way to ICU - patient with high O2 requirements difficult to ventilate due to gurneys
and carts blocking access for second provider to assist. Patient desaturated, [we] stopped and [the patient]
recovered.
Faulty design Equipment malfunction
Checking ICU equipment pre-emptively while on call: Glidescope [in first ICU] missing. Glidescope
[in another ICU] with reusable handle plugged into end of disposable handle cord . . .so the cord had
two handles on either side and no way to plug into the glidescope machine. Glidescope
[in yet another ICU] without handles at all.
Equipment unavailability
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Our study has several limitations. First, we are limited
by our small sample size. The number of events reported
per 1,000 ICU patient days is markedly lower than that
reported in previous studies [5–9, 15, 16]. However,
anesthesia providers function in a different role in the
ICU than critical care providers; for instance, anesthesia
providers may only be involved in the care of ICU pa-
tients during procedures, transport, or emergency situa-
tions. Thus, it may not be reasonable to expect similar
event rates. Of note, the number of near miss reports
per anesthesia case was similar in the ICU and outside
the ICU, suggesting similar reporting patterns. Nonethe-
less, since our reporting system is voluntary, we are un-
likely to be capturing all near misses. Additionally, our
reporting system, in which providers submit reports via
an online interface, may not be the ideal mechanism for
capturing critical incidents. Mandatory online reporting,
[17] paper collection cards, [5, 7–9, 18], real-time audits,
[19] facilitated incident monitoring, [20] and direct ob-
servation [16] may increase the number of events
captured.
Second, our near miss system captures limited infor-
mation in order to minimize the time required to report
an event. As such, additional data that could enhance
our analysis, such as the provider’s role in the care of
the patient, or the patient’s age and comorbidities are
not available.
Additionally, the differences observed between ICU
near misses and near misses from other anesthesia loca-
tions may simply be due to differences in the nature of
care in the ICU as compared to other locations where
anesthesia is provided. And, differences between the
causal mechanisms associated with our near misses and
those previously published in the literature may be con-
founded by heterogeneity in the definitions of the mech-
anisms being studied. Furthermore, since our near miss
system collects reports solely from providers within the
department of anesthesia, it is not possible to compare
reports submitted by anesthesia providers to those sub-
mitted by other specialists.
Finally, since our data were collected from a single
academic anesthesia department with a large number of
critical care trained faculty, our findings may not be
generalizable to other institutions.
Conclusions
To our knowledge, this is the first analysis of near miss
reports associated with ICU care from the perspective of
the anesthesia provider. A few causal mechanisms ex-
plained the majority of ICU near misses, providing tar-
gets for quality improvement. Errors associated with
airway management may be more common in the ICU
than other anesthesia locations; further efforts to under-
stand the dangers of airway management in the ICU are
needed. Specialist consultants may be able to identify
systems weaknesses not identified by critical care pro-
viders, and should be engaged in the ICU patient safety
movement.
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